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NOTE
Showdown Over the California Showup
By Catherine -4. Rivlin*
Introduction
A showup is an identification procedure that presents a criminal
suspect singly to a witness.' Although criticized by the United States
Supreme Court2 and discouraged by the California Supreme Court,3
the procedure is nevertheless commonly upheld in both state and fed-
eral courts.4 The legal history of the showup in California and in many
other states is an intricate web of conflict between state and federal
standards. This conflict reflects changes in the political and philosophi-
cal composition of the high courts, the stress of applying new facts to
old reasoning, and the awakening interest of the electorate.
There are two independent due process challenges that a criminal
defendant may raise to a pretrial identification procedure and to any
related identification testimony at trial. These challenges are based on
a trilogy of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court on June
12, 1967.
Two cases, United States v. Wade5 and Gilbert v. Caifornit con-
cemed post-indictment, pretrial lineups.7 The Supreme Court held that
a post-indictment lineup conducted without counsel and without valid
* B.A., 1979, Swarthmore College; M.B.A. candidate, University of California, Berke-
ley; member, third year class.
1. See People v. Hall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 299, 309, 157 Cal. Rptr. 107, 113 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967). Describing the Stovall v.
Denno showup, the Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967) observed, "It is
hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the suggestion to the witness that the one
presented is believed guilty by the police."
3. See, e.g., In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997, 1004-05, 458 P.2d 449, 454-55, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537,
542-43 (1969).
4. SeePeoplev. Craig, 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 913, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (1978) and the
cases cited therein. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
5. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
6. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
7. In a lineup, a witness is shown a group of individuals and asked whether he can
identify any member of that group. The witness generally is isolated from the individuals in
the lineup.
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waiver of the right to counsel violates the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment due process right to the assistance of counsel at every critical
stage in the criminal proceeding. 8 The Court also ruled that the admis-
sion of in-court identification evidence following an invalid lineup is
reversible error unless the prosecution proves that the in-court identifi-
cation had an origin independent from the unconstitutional lineup or
that the tainted in-court identification was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.9
The third case, Stovall v. Denno,'° involved a showup. In Stovall,
the Supreme Court considered a defendant's general due process pro-
tection in his encounters with law enforcement authorities. The Court
concluded by outlining a separate constitutional challenge. A pretrial
identification procedure that is so unnecessarily suggestive and condu-
cive to irreparable misidentification.that it denies the defendant due
process of law is constitutionally impermissible."
The Wade-Gilbert right to counsel challenge and the Stovall v.
Denno "unnecessary suggestiveness" challenge have developed simul-
taneously. Both are often raised by a single defendant.12 This Note
first traces the development of the right to counsel rule as applied to
showups, discusses the due process suggestiveness issue, and concludes
with a synthesis of the two doctrines in light of an overall theory of
pretrial identification procedure.
I. A Right to Counsel at Pretrial Identification: The First
Federal Steps and the California Extensions
A. The Wade-Gilbert Rule
In Wade and Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court determined
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to the
assistance of counsel at a post-indictment, pretrial lineup. 3 To give
substance to this right, the majority decreed that testimony concerning
an unconstitutional lineup is inadmissible per se and that an in-court
identification by a witness who has previously identified the defendant
at an invalid lineup is inadmissible absent a basis fully independent
8. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
272 (1967). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 272 (1967). In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967), the Supreme Court an-
nounced that it would apply the Wade-Gilbert rule prospectively only.
10. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
11. Id. at 301-02.
12. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 126 Cal. App. 3d 447, 453-54, 178 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878-
79 (1981).
13. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 272.
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from the tainted pretrial procedure. 4 The decisions drew a strong dis-
senting and concurring opinion from Justice White in which he was
joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart.15 Justice White took exception
to the Court's per se rule excluding evidence from a lineup conducted
without counsel or adequate waiver.' 6 Justice White asserted, however,
that in one regard the majority opinion did not go far enough. The
logic of the majority argument compelled a requirement that the prose-
cution establish an independent origin for any in-court identification
testimony, whether or not the presence of counsel at a particular pre-
trial identification would serve the interests of justice.' 7
The Court in both Wade and Gilbert consistently used the modifier
"post-indictment." Over the next five years the higher courts of several
states, including California, came to view that adjective as merely de-
scriptive of the Wade and Gilbert fact situations, rather than expositive
of the limits of the legal doctrine. 8
The California Supreme Court first signalled that it would extend
the Wade-Gilbert rule in People v. Fowler.9 A warrant issued for
Fowler after two robbery victims picked his picture out of a photo ar-
ray. Three months after the Wade and Gilbert decisions, and a year
after the effective date of Miranda v. Arizona,20 Fowler turned himself
in to the police. Fowler was read his Miranda rights and his statement
was taken. Pursuant to a police department directive, he was asked
whether he had a lawyer; he did not. Fowler was then placed in a pre-
indictment lineup without being told that he was entitled to have a
court appointed lawyer present. The two victims identified Fowler at
the lineup and subsequently at trial.
The California Supreme Court concluded that the reasoning of
Wade and Gilbert applied to all lineups, whether or not the suspect had
been formally bound over for trial.2 ' The court observed: "A lineup
14. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 241-42; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 272.
15. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250-59 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and con-
curring). In Gilbert, Justice White incorporated by reference his dissenting opinion in Wade.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 290 (1967) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
16. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and
concurring).
17. Id at 251.
18. See, e.g., People v. Fowler, I Cal. 3d 335, 343-44, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr.
363, 370 (1969); Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025, 1032-33 (Alaska 1972), rey'd on othergrounds,
415 U.S. 308 (1974). But see People v. Palmer, 41111. 2d 571, 573-74, 244 N.E.2d 173, 174-75
(1969); State v. Boens, 8 Ariz. App. 110, 112, 443 P.2d 925, 927 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 500-01, 238 N.E.2d 343, 346-47 (1968); State v. Bertha, 4 N.C. App.
422, 424-25, 167 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1969).
19. 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335,342,461 P.2d 643, 648-49, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368-69
(1969).
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which occurs prior to the point in question [indictment] may be fraught
with the same risks of suggestion as one occurring after that point, and
may result in the same far-reaching consequences for the defendant."22
The Court found particular support for its interpretation in Wade,
noting that the majority recognized a responsibility to "scrutinize any
pretrial confrontation" for potential due process violations.2 3 The Cali-
fornia court also found it significant that the majority in Wade did not
answer the dissent's assertion that the rule "applies to any lineup, to
any other techniques employed to produce an identification and aforti-
ori to a face-to-face encounter between the witness and the suspect
alone, regardless of when in time or place, and whether before or after
indictment or information."'24 Although raising the possibility that the
right to counsel rule should extend to showups, the court stopped short
of explicitly reaching that conclusion.
In an important footnote, the court in Fowler distinguished be-
tween extending the principles of Wade-Gilbert to nonlineup confronta-
tions and extending the specific rule drawn from those principles to
factual situations different from Wade and Gilbert.2 5 This distinction
foreshadowed more than a decade of judicial uncertainty over how
those principles ought to be applied to "face-to-face encounters be-
tween the witness and the suspect alone."
B. The Balancing Test
The California Supreme Court in Fowler addressed the nonlineup
applications of Wade-Gilbert even more directly in another important
footnote.26 The court perceived the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel rule
and the Stovallunnecessary suggestiveness rule as mutually exclusive.2 7
The majority instructed that in choosing which rule to apply to a par-
ticular identification situation, the reviewing court must balance the
need for prompt nonlineup identification "against the need for and
ability of counsel to help avoid erroneous identification."2
In People v. Martin,29 this footnote from Fowler was expanded into
22. Id at 342, 461 P.2d at 649, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
23. Id. at 343, 461 P.2d at 649, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (emphasis in original) (quoting
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)).
24. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d at 343, 343 n.14, 461 P.2d at 649-50 & n.14, 82 Cal. Rptr.
at 369-70 & n.14 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 251 (1967)).
25. "We do not suggest that the rules enunciated to govern lineups were meant to gov-
ern all pretrial confrontations - whether or not in a lineup context. We do suggest that the
principles informing rules governing lineups are broadly applicable to all pretrial confronta-
tions." People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d at 342, 342 n.13, 461 P.2d at 649 & n.13, 82 Cal. Rptr. at
369 & n.13 (emphasis in original).
26. Id at 344 n.16, 461 P.2d at 650-51 n.16, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71 n.16.
27. Id
28. Id at 345 n.16, 461 P.2d at 651 n.16, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n.16.
29. 2 Cal. 3d 822, 829, 471 P.2d 29, 34, 87 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1970).
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a general condemnation of police station showups. The defendant was
exhibited as a sole suspect. While flanked by uniformed officers in a
police interrogation room, he was identified through a one way mirror
by the victims. The California Supreme Court applied the Fowler bal-
ancing test and concluded that once everybody was at the police sta-
tion, a lineup could have been arranged with a modicum of additional
inconvenience.30 The presence of counsel at a lineup might have re-
duced the risks of suggestiveness inherent in the identification proce-
dure, "if only through a comprehensive testimonial reconstruction of
the confrontation at trial."3' The Court, therefore, found a violation of
the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel at a critical stage in
the prosecution.
32
Borrowing from Wade, the court in Martin listed the factors to be
considered in determining whether a subsequent in-court identification
had a basis independent from the unconstitutional showup:
1. the witness's opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the
time of the alleged criminal act;
2. the existance of any divergence between the witness's
preprocedure description and an actual description of the
defendant;
3. the witness's identification of another person or failure to
identify the defendant at any other identification procedure;
4. the length of time between the alleged criminal act and the
identification procedure; and
5. the degree of certainty exhibited by the witness in the identi-
fication of the actual perpetrator.33
Since the determination of an independent origin had not been made at
trial, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial in order to offer
the prosecution the opportunity to establish an independent origin.
34
The California Supreme Court could have overturned the lower
court decision on the theory that the stationhouse showup was unneces-
sarily suggestive under Stoval.35 In that way the high court would
have discouraged the use of showup procedures without extending the
right to counsel into the showup arena. As it stands now, it is open to
question whether the right to counsel might extend to showups merely
to enable defense counsel to testify at trial as to the circumstances of
the identification procedure.
30. Id at 828-30, 471 P.2d at 34-35, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
31. Id at 830, 471 P.2d at 34-35, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
32. Id at 830, 471 P.2d at 35, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
33. Id at 831-33, 471 P.2d at 35-37, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 715-17.
34. Id at 835, 471 P.2d at 38, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
35. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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C. Right to Counsel at the Showup
In People'v. Anthony,36 decided less than a year after Martin, the
California Court of Appeal took up the question of whether Wade, Gil-
bert, and Fowler guaranteed a California suspect the right to the assist-
ance of counsel at a showup taking place in the field. Without
distinguishing or even referring to Martin, the court ruled that on-the-
spot identification procedures do not give rise to a right to counsel.
37
The court in Anthony reviewed decisions that did not find a viola-
tion of the right to counsel when defendants were exhibited soon after
the crime while in the presence of arresting officers or handcuffed and
seated in police vehicles.38 The rationale for those decisions, according
to the Court in Anthony, was "the great reliability of on-the-spot identi-
fication by the victim; the service to law enforcement, the public and
the criminal suspect of knowing promptly whether the right person has
been apprehended; and the practical impossibility of representation by
counsel at an immediate in-the-field identification.
39
Subsequent decisions have focused on how near in time and place
to the alleged criminal act the showup must be in order to fall under
the Anthony rule.' In showup cases, California courts essentially have
ignored the Martin proscription of stationhouse showups held without
counsel.
II. Federal Retrenchment and the California Response
A. The New Federal Standard
Five years after the Wade-Gilbert rule was announced by the War-
ren Court, the Burger Court limited its applicability, thereby creating a
dilemma for those courts that had broadly interpreted the standard. In
Kirby v. Illinois,4 the Court was faced with a pre-indictment police sta-
tion showup in a factual setting similar to that presented to the Califor-
nia appellate court in Martin. Despite the suggestion in Wade to the
contrary,42 a majority of the Supreme Court in Kirby held that the right
of counsel does not extend to pre-indictment confrontations.
43
36. 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1970).
37. Id at 763-64, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
38. Id at 764, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767, 776 (two suspects handcuffed in a police car). The
cases discussed by the court are People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 118, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659
(1969) (suspect handcuffed beside a police car); People v. Levine, 276 Cal. App. 2d 206, 80
Cal. Rptr. 731 (1969) (showup at the crime scene, suspect accompanied by uniformed police
officers).
39. People v. Anthony, 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 764, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767, 776 (1970).
40. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 299,310, 157 Cal. Rptr. 107, 113-14 (1979).
41. 406 U.S. 683 (1972).
42. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 251 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
43. 406 U.S. at 690.
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In Kirby, the Court determined that the "critical stage of the prose-
cution" triggering the right to counsel could arise only after the formal
commencement of criminal proceedings "whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment."'  As it now stands, the United States Constitution guarantees
counsel to defendants only in post-indictment lineups or their
equivalent.
B. The California Supreme Court's Response
Shortly after Kirby, the California Supreme Court, in People v.
Chojnacky,4 5 relied upon Kirby to affirm a conviction in, olving a pre-
indictment lineup held without counsel: 6 The California Supreme
Court did not face the issue again until 1981, when People v. Busta-
mante47 was decided. Without the federal Constitution on which to
base a right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup, the California
Supreme Court concluded that it had two choices.4" First, it could, as
in Chojnacky, dismiss the Fowler decision as a mistaken extension of
the Wade-Gilbert rule beyond its federal limits. Alternatively, the court
could rule that counsel be required by virtue of the right to counsel
provision in the California Constitution,49 even though the United
States Supreme Court rejected such a requirement based on the almost
identically worded right to counsel provision of the Sixth Amend-
ment." Writing for the court, Justice Tobriner asserted that the Cali-
fornia Constitution, however similarly worded, is a "document of
independent force."'"
In Bustamante, the California Supreme Court ruled that the state
constitution guaranteed California defendants the right to counsel at all
lineups.52 The majority explained that the right to counsel at lineups
had arisen out of judicial "appreciation of the proverbial unreliability
of eyewitness identification of strangers, and of the dangers that im-
proper, inadvertent or deliberate suggestion at a lineup will irradicably
influence identification testimony. '53 The court admitted that "counsel
44. Id at 689-90.
45. 8 Cal. 3d 759, 505 P.2d 530, 106 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1973).
46. Id at 764-65, 505 P.2d at 533, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
47. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981).
48. Id at 95-96, 634 P.2d at 931-32, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81 (1981).
49. Article I, section 15, of the Constitution of the State of California states in pertinent
part: "The defendant in a criminal cause has the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel
for the defendant's defense." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
50. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690 (1972). For the pertinent text of the Sixth Amendment, see
supra note 8.
51. People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 97, 634 P.2d 927, 933, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582
(1981).
52. Id at 100-02, 634 P.2d at 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85.
53. Id at 92, 634 P.2d at 929, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
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plays only a limited role at the lineup itself."54 Nevertheless, the court
noted the following beneficial influences from the presence of counsel:
(1) encouragement for police adoption and implementation of regula-
tions to ensure the fairness of lineups; (2) detection of inadvertent
suggestiveness; and (3) better defense preparation for cross-examina-
tion of the identifying witness(es). 5
The court in Bustamante did not apply the Fowler balancing test
directly to the pre-indictment lineup. Instead, the court found a consti-
tutional basis for a right to counsel at lineups and determined that a
distinction between pre- and post-indictment lineups did not affect the
analysis.
The supreme court's language in Bustamante appears deliberately
broad. For example, the court quoted the Michigan Supreme Court's
statement that "'once any identification decision is made it may well
be "irreparable." '56 In addition, the California court concluded that
it would be arbitrary to limit the right to counsel to post-indictment
lineups, but gave only a hint whether the limitation to lineups would be
considered equally arbitrary. The implication, however, was that at
least the distinction between lineups and field showups would remain
valid.
The hint appeared in the discussion of exceptions to the right to
counsel rule. The California Supreme Court addressed the State Attor-
ney General's objection that extending the right to counsel to lineups
held before the filing of formal charges would place an unnecessary
burden on law enforcement. The court stated that "if conditions re-
quire immediate identification without even minimal delay, or if coun-
sel cannot be present within a reasonable time, such exigent
circumstances will justify proceeding without counsel. '57 To explain
further the term "exigent circumstances," the court added in a footnote
that counsel should be provided at a pre-indictment lineup unless that
provision "'would unduly interfere with a prompt and purposeful
investigation.' "I
This concession is significant. The Miranda v. Arizona 9 require-
ment of a valid waiver of counsel at all custodial interrogations has not
been conditioned upon noninterference with the speed and purpose of
the investigation. The phrase may have been chosen to permit field
54. Id at 99, 634 P.2d at 934, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
55. Id
56. Id at 98, 634 P.2d at 933, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (quoting People v. Anderson, 389
Mich. 155, 203, 205 N.W.2d 461, 485 (1973)).
57. People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 101-02, 634 P.2d 927, 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576,
584 (1981).
58. Id at 102 n.9, 634 P.2d at 935 n.9, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85 n.9 (quoting Blue v.
State, 558 P.2d 636,642 (Alaska 1977)).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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identification procedures under the circumstances of People v.
Anthony.
60
The question of whether or not Bustamante created a right to
counsel for California suspects at showups in the field, however, was
never judicially determined. Before any post-Bustamante field identifi-
cations came up on appeal, the voters of the State of California over-
ruled Bustamante by an amendment to the state constitution.6'
C. Proposition 8: Hearing From the Counties
Section 28 (d) of Article I of the California Constitution was ad-
ded by the passage of Ballot Proposition 8 on June 8, 1982. Titled
"Right to Truth-in-Evidence," the provision reads as follows:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds
vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, in-
cluding pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in
any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether
heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall
affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege
or hearsay, or Evidence Code, sections 352, 782, or 1103. Noth-
ing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitu-
tional right of the press.
62
The purpose and major effect of the amendment, as explained in the
voter information pamphlets and in the implementation guides to law
enforcement officials, is to restore federal decisional law; the amend-
ment was passed to overrule state decisions that are based on the state
constitution or statutory scheme, and which exclude evidence admissi-
ble in federal court.63
60. 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 764, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767, 777 (1970). Anthony is discussed supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text. One California court of appeal relied on Anthony to
uphold a field identification procedure taking place before the effective date of Bustamante.
People v. Jones, 126 Cal. App. 3d 308, 178 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1981). In another unusual case,
an appellate court upheld a post-Bustamante in-court showup. People v. Fairley, 135 Cal.
App. 3d 182, 185 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1982).
61. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28, cl. (d).
62. Id California Evidence Code sections 352 (balancing of probative value against the
probability that admitting the evidence will consume too much time or create a substantial
danger of undue prejudice), 782 (procedure for determining the relevance of evidence of
prior sexual conduct of alleged victims), and 1103 (admissibility of character evidence of
alleged victims) are not directly relevant to this discussion.
63. Ballot Pamphlet, Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with Arguments to Voters, Prim.
Elec. (June 8, 1982), argument in favor of Prop. 8, at 34, quotedin Brosnahan v. Brown, 32
Cal. 3d 236, 248, 651 P.2d 274, 281, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 37 (1982); CAL. DEPT. OF JUST., OFF.
OF THE CAL. ATT'y GEN., GUIDE TO PROPOsmON 8, 4-4, 4-8, 4-37 (1982). There is dicta in
People v. Chavers, 33 Cal. 3d 462, 467, 658 P.2d 96, 99, 189 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (1983)
indicating that the California Supreme Court believes that goal was accomplished.
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Proposition 8, which enacted several constitutional amendments as
well as statutes, has already withstood challenges to its constitutionality
based on its scope.' It generally is anticipated that defendants will
raise the most serious constitutional challenges to the measure, one pro-
vision at a time.65 Judicial treatment of the "Right to Truth-in-Evi-
dence" provision, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
Assuming that full effect is given to the amendment, then the less
stringent federal standard would govern all criminal identification
cases. It should be recalled that even a finding that the defendant was
deprived of counsel in violation of a Sixth Amendment right does not
make reversal on appeal certain. An in-court identification may have
an independent basis and be free of the taint caused by a violative pre-
trial procedure.66 Furthermore, the improper admission of evidence
from an unconstitutional identification procedure may be harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.67
In addition to alleging that their Sixth Amendment rights were vi-
olated by the method and circumstances of the identification, defend-
ants often contend that their due process rights were infringed. Parts
III and IV discuss the historical development and current status of the
due process claim.
III. History of the Unnecessary Suggestiveness Standard: The
Totality of the Circumstances Test
In addition to actions based on the Sixth Amendment, the consti-
tutionality of the showup has been challenged on the ground that it is
"so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification that [the defendant is] deprived of due process of law"
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 68 The standard was erected by the
United States Supreme Court in Stovall v. Denno.69 The Court ac-
knowledged that "the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for
the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been
widely condemned."7 Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to set forth
the skeletal framework of a test that is still in use: "[A] claimed viola-
tion of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on
the totality of the circumstances.'
64. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 247,253,260-61, 651 P.2d 274,284,288-89, 186
Cal. Rptr. 30, 40, 44-45 (1982).
65. See id at 241, 651 P.2d at 277, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
66. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967) (quoting Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).
67. 388 U.S. at 242 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
68. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
69. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
70. Id. at 302.
71. Id
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The totality of the circumstances test has been fleshed out over
years of application in both the federal and state courts. The trial court
must apply objective factors in making the determination whether a
challenged showup "gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrep-
arable misidentification."72 The factors commonly applied include:
The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; the witness' degree of attention; the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal; the level of uncertainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and the length
of time between the crime and the confrontation.7"
These objective factors are virtually identical to those used to de-
termine whether an in-court identification has a basis independent of a
pretrial identification that violates defendant's right to counsel." They
deal not so much with the circumstances of the showup itself. Rather,
given how much the witness saw and the nature of the showup in ques-
tion, the concern is whether the witness would identify a suspect accu-
rately.75 The totality of the circumstances test protects the due process
rights of defendants by emphasizing the truth-seeking function of the
court.
Consistent with the goal of accurate identification, California
courts have routinely upheld suggestive identification procedures. The
California courts will allow evidence from a showup conducted at or
near the scene of the crime and within a reasonable period of time, as
long as the witness had spent time with the perpetrator under memora-
ble circumstances; had given an accurate, even if general, description;
and had expressed confidence in the identification.76
In Kirby v. Illinois, in which the United States Supreme Court de-
termined that it would not extend the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel
rule to pre-indictment lineups,7 7 the Court reemphasized that the
Stovall totality of the circumstances test applied to any pretrial con-
frontation.78 The fourth part of this Note discusses the desirability of
extending the right to counsel beyond its present confines in light of the
substantial protections of the suggestiveness rule and the nature of field
identifications.
72. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); People v. Edwards, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 447, 454, 178 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879 (1981).
73. People v. Savala, 116 Cal. App. 3d 41, 49, 171 Cal. Rptr. 882, 886 (1981); People v.
Hall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 299, 309, 157 Cal. Rptr. 107, 113 (1979) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)).
74. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
75. On this point the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188 (1972), is particularly instructive. In Neil, the Court observed that "it is the likeli-
hood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process." Id at 198.
76. See supra note 4.
77. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
78. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972).
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IV. Prejudice, Predisposition, and the Presence of Counsel
In United States v. Wade, 9 the Supreme Court established the
right of an accused criminal to be represented by counsel at a post-
indictment lineup.80 The Court cited other situations in which it had
found a pretrial right to counsel. 81 In Miranda v. Arizona, for example,
the right to counsel at a custodial interrogation was held to be neces-
sary in order to assure that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination survived the police attempt to elicit incriminating evi-
dence from the accused.82 In Wade, however, the Supreme Court
based the right to counsel at lineups upon a broader consideration of
the right to a fair trial:
It is central to [the] principle [established in Powell v. Alabama83]
that in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guar-
anteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage
of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a
fair trial.
84
Summarizing its review of the precedents, the Court concluded
that the principle found in cases from Powell to Miranda
requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the ac-
cused to determine whether the presence of counsel is necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by
his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him
and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It
calls upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice
to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and
the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.85
Building on the background presented in parts I, II, and III, the present
part undertakes the analysis mandated by Wade, treating first the ques-
tion of inherent potential for prejudice in field identifications, and sec-
ond the ability of counsel to neutralize the threat of prejudice.
A. The Potential for Prejudice
. The Witness' Susceptibility to Suggestion
In Wade, the Supreme Court found the greatest potential for prej-
udicial suggestion when the witness had an insubstantial opportunity to
view the alleged perpetrator at the time of the crime. 86 The Court
79. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
80. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
81. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1967).
82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83. 287 U.S. 45 (1964).
84. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
85. Id at 227.
86. Id at 229.
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feared that police would take unwitting advantage of a witness' incom-
plete mental picture of the perpetrator. By unintentionally indicating
which person in the lineup was the official suspect, the police would
cause the witness to accept the suspect as the perpetrator. Once having
identified a suspect at a suggestive lineup, the Court reasoned, the wit-
ness' conviction that he had identified the true culprit would be un-
shakable and the suggestive nature of the lineup might be impossible to
uncover on cross-examination.
7
The Court in Wade further observed that the potential for sugges-
tion existed whether the procedure was a formal lineup or the less for-
mal "presentation of the suspect alone to the witness.""" The special
concern for the susceptibility to suggestion of witnesses who did not
obtain a good look at the perpetrator at the time of the crime reveals
the Court's perception of the dangers of pretrial identification. The
Court appears to have been most concerned with preventing misiden-
tification due to improper suggestion at any confrontation, rather than
with curtailing particular types of pretrial identification or extending
the right to counsel any further than necessary to assure a fair trial.8 9
If the witness does not have a clear or detailed mental image of the
perpetrator when a confrontation between witness and suspect occurs,
then that witness is considered more likely to be sensitive to suggestive
influence. A lineup usually takes place days, weeks, or even months
after the incident;9 consequently the chance of memory loss is great.9"
Therefore, a field identification taking place moments after the alleged
crime - when the memory is fresh - may be one of the most reliable
forms of identification procedure.
92
The time factor, and the related danger of susceptibility to sugges-
tiveness to fill in gaps in the witness' memory, is an element of overlap
between: (1) the right to counsel analysis;93 (2) the independent basis
requirement for admission of in-court identification testimony despite
an unconstitutional confrontation;94 and (3) the unnecessary sugges-
87. Id at 229-30.
88. Id
89. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 199 (1972). In United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 311-12 (1973), the Court's primary concern was with the lay defendant's need for coun-
sel at trial-like confrontations. Observing that to extend Wade beyond the confrontation
context "would result in drastic expansion of the right to counsel," the Court held that a
defendant does not have a right to counsel at a pretrial photographic identification. Id at
316, 317-21.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,220 (1967) (seven months); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 269 (1967) (over two weeks).
91. People v. Anthony, 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 764-65, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767, 777 (1970).
92. See id at 764-65, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 777; See also supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
93. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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tiveness standard of Stovall." If the witness did not have an adequate
opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time of the alleged crime, the
subsequent identification procedure will lead to inadmissible evidence
under at least one of three tests: (1) testimony of a post-indictment
lineup conducted without counsel would be excluded per se; (2) subse-
quent in-court identification would be irretrievably tainted as having
no independent basis; or (3) the lineup itself would be unnecessarily
suggestive under the Stovall standard.
The issue of the underlying susceptibility to suggestion relates to
the circumstances at the crime scene and, therefore, transcends the par-
ticular form of identification procedure adopted by police.96 The wit-
ness often will be the only person who can attest to his ability to
observe the perpetrator at the time of the crime. If the witness obtained
a clear look at the perpetrator under circumstances which would permit
or encourage him to remember the perpetrator's physical characteris-
tics, then it would take a very suggestive identification procedure to get
that witness to identify someone other than the true culprit.9"
2. Suggestive Elements of the Showup Procedure
After determining the witness' susceptibility to suggestion, the
court must evaluate the degree of suggestion created by the mechanics
of the confrontation procedure. For example, a lineup becomes sugges-
tive if the defendant is presented in a manner that distinguishes him
from the others in the lineup as the one the police consider to be the
perpetrator.98 A properly conducted formal lineup has been compared
to a fingerprint comparison or blood test.99 The witness, under ideal
95. see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
96. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 254 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and
concurring).
97. There is an implied "average witness" assumption in the susceptibility analysis.
This section assumes that the witness's susceptibility to suggestion is the result of the circum-
stances of the crime or the identification procedure. The character of the witness and the
quality of her ability to perceive and remember are separate evidence problems for which
the traditional tools of cross-examination have developed. A technically correct lineup,
staged eight feet in front of the witness, can be effectively attacked by a defense counsel who
establishes in court that the witness has trouble distinguishing shapes more than five feet
away. On the other hand, objective evidence that a witness is highly reliable is also persua-
sive. In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972), for example, the Court concluded that a
showup seven months after the crime was not improper where, among other factors, the
witness had proven herself reliable by refusing to identify other suspects at previous
showups.
98. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,235 (1967) (quoting Williams & Hammelman,
Ident#Fatlon Parades, Part I, CRIM. L. REV. 479, 483 (1963)).
99. The Supreme Court has noted several important distinctions between scientific
analysis of physical evidence and pretrial confrontation to elicit identification evidence.
Based on these distinctions, the Court concluded that while pretrial confrontation is a criti-
cal stage in the prosecution, requiring the presence of counsel, the analysis of physical evi-
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circumstances, compares his memory of the perpetrator with each of
the individuals present and determines whether there is a match.
By contrast, a field showup may occur under any of a wide variety
of circumstances that often involve a considerable degree of suggestion.
These include, for example, identification as the suspect is fleeing the
scene, or while the suspect is in the presence of the witness and police
officers, whether voluntarily, while temporarily detained, or firmly in
custody. Although the procedure is generally upheld, many courts ad-
mit that the field showup is highly suggestive in nature.00 Not only is
the witness faced with only a single subject for recognition, rather than
the array of similar persons customarily accumulated for a lineup or
photo identification, but that person may be surrounded by uniformed
officers, handcuffed, or seated in a police vehicle. 01
It must be noted that courts requiring counsel at lineups have per-
ceived a psychological effect that presents a special danger to the fair-
ness of the lineup procedure: the witness may be sensitive to the hard
work expended and expertise applied by the investigating officers.' 0 z A
witness who is aware of the investigation leading up to the lineup may
feel pressure not to let the officers down by failing to identify someone.
Similarly, a witness may defer to the professional judgment of the in-
vestigating officers that the perpetrator is in the lineup; that witness
may identify a person based on clues either intentionally or inadver-
tently given by the officers about which person in the lineup is the offi-
cial candidate.
The suggestiveness inherent in a lineup should not be of concern
to a court that is reviewing a witness' susceptibility to suggestion in a
field showup. Moments after the event, when the investigation has
barely started, the witness surely will not feel the same pressure to
agree with perceived police conclusions about the identity of the culprit
as might attend a lineup. At a field showup, the police usually have not
gathered enough information to identify the culprit. From the point of
view of the witness, therefore, telling the police they have the wrong
person is not tantamount to criticizing their professional judgment or
informing them that they have wasted their time. The officers can sim-
dence is not. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967). See also infra text
accompanying notes 158-59; Comment, The Calfornia Constitution and Counsel at Pretrial
Lineups: Disneyland Claims or Deadly Serious Business?2 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 83, 98 (1974).
100. The distinction between merely "suggestive" and "unnecessarily suggestive" or "im-
permissibly suggestive" procedures is critical. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 126 Cal. App. 308,
317, 178 Cal. Rptr. 818, 822 (1981); People v. Odom, 108 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 289 (1980).
101. See, e.g., People v. Savala, 116 Cal. App. 3d 41, 49, 171 Cal. Rptr. 882, 886 (1981);
In re Richard W., 91 Cal. App. 3d 960, 969-70, 155 Cal. Rptr. 11, 18 (1979); People v. Craig,
86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 914, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (1978).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
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ply release the first suspect and continue to look for the right person
without any great loss of invested time or effort.
To summarize the suggestiveness analysis, although a field showup
first appears to be more suggestive than a formal lineup, it may be less
suggestive. Two of the factors to which the Supreme Court has pointed
as translating suggestive identification procedures into a substantial
likelihood of irreparable mistaken identification are absent or reduced
by the very nature of the field showup situation. The witness often has
had a recent look at the perpetrator. In addition, the pressures gener-
ated by the time and effort connected with a protracted police investi-
gation generally do not exist because the showup occurs within a short
time after the event. The witness' overriding 'concern is the apprehen-
sion of the actual perpetrator. If the showup would otherwise pass the
Stovall totality of the circumstances test, the right to counsel analysis
indicates there is not any great danger of misidentification.
B. The Ability of Counsel to Help Avoid Prejudice
The other half of the Wade analysis involves the likely contribu-
tion of counsel toward preventing an improper identification procedure
from prejudicing the defendant's rights at trial." 3 Most courts dealing
with this issue have been either vague or silent about the details of
counsel's role at the identification procedure, including counsel's role
in avoiding prejudice to defendant's rights at trial."° The language of
Wade and Stovall indicates that the Supreme Court believed both that
counsel could prevent unfairness at the confrontation and that counsel
could use what he saw to assure "meaningful examination of the identi-
fication witness' testimony at trial."' 05 As this section demonstrates,
the Court's double conclusion was inadequately supported.
L The Prevention of Unfairness in the Field
The susceptibility of a witness to suggestion depends largely on the
circumstances of the crime itself' °6 Since counsel presumably was not
present at the crime, counsel's contribution to the fairness of the con-
frontation depends on his ability to discourage the creation of sugges-
tive circumstances.
Several courts have concluded that the mere presence of counsel
103. Id at 227.
104. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 252-53 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and
concurring). See also Comment, Photo-Identqfcatdons: A Right to Counsel? 7 CAL. W.L. REv.
161, 161 n.5 (1970).
105. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
298 (1967).
106. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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will deter improper suggestion by the investigating officers."0 7 How-
ever, the officers themselves, the identifying witness, and the suspect
may all be called to testify about the circumstances of the confronta-
tion. It seems likely that this testimony also acts as a significant deter-
rent to suggestion.'
Other than to observe and simply to be present, the Court in Wade
did not suggest a role or any particular activities for the defense counsel
to perform at the lineup. Since participation in a lineup does not impli-
cate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, counsel
cannot advise the accused to decline to participate, as counsel called in
under Mfiranda may do. 09 The nebulous benefits of mere presence at
the procedure would not seem to justify the social costs of requiring
counsel at the less formal pretrial identification procedures." 0
2 The Effectiveness of Examination at Trial
A principal concern in any evidentiary problem should be the
quality of the information that reaches the trier of fact. The jury or
judge was not present for the commission of the alleged crime; neither
were the defense nor prosecution attorneys. Furthermore, it is gener-
ally agreed that there are inherent difficulties in relying upon eyewit-
ness testimony."'
The adversary system of justice deals with these problems by per-
mitting the calling of witnesses and the presentation of other evidence
of what actually transpired. Cross-examination is permitted to test the
quality of the evidence. Much of the evidence presented by the prose-
cution will have been collected out of the presence of defense coun-
sel. 2 And yet defense counsel generally is relied upon to ferret out the
107. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967); People v. Bustamante, 30
Cal. 3d 88, 99, 634 P.2d 927, 934, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 583 (1981).
108. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 253 & n.3 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and
concurring).
109. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1967). See also People v. Bustamante,
30 Cal. 3d 88, 99 & n.7, 634 P.2d 927, 934 & n.7, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 583 & n.7 (1981).
110. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 254-55 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and
concurring); People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 118, 126-27, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664-65
(1969).
Ill. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967); see also id at 254 (White, J.,
dissenting and concurring).
112. For example, counsel need not be present for the taking of witness statements or the
collection at the scene of physical evidence, such as fingerprints. These are tasks law en-
forcement officials are trusted to perform. Similarly, the California Supreme Court has ex-
pressed confidence in the ability of police officers to conduct an impartial identification
procedure. In recognizing a defendant's right to demand a lineup under certain circum-
stances, the court stated, "The procedure is one which uniquely falls within police expertise
and routine practices." Evans v. Superior Court, I 1 Cal. 3d 617, 625-26, 522 P.2d 681, 687,
114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 127 (1974).
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weaknesses in the prosecution's case through the adroit use of discov-
ery, research, and examination techniques.
The dissenters in Wade viewed the members of the majority as
having succumbed to a well intentioned, but unrealistic desire to preg-
ent the trier of fact with perfect information.' 1 3 Without having been
present, competent counsel should, in the view of the minority, be able
to develop the circumstances of a pretrial identification procedure in
the same way that they develop an understanding of what occurred at
the commission of the crime. 14 The problems of perception, memory,
and ability to describe should apply equally in both situations."'
The counterargument, made by the Wade majority, is that many
identifications are conducted in a manner that prevents the suspect
from seeing the witness.1 6 If neither the witness nor the police can be
relied upon for fully objective or observant testimony about the cir-
cumstances surrounding the identification, it may be necessary to have
present an observer representing defendant's interests.' 7 Based on his
personal observations at the identification procedure, defense counsel
may cross-examine prosecution witnesses, examine the defendant di-
rectly, or even put himself on the stand.
18
The dissent in Wade also objected to the costs associated with im-
plementing the Wade rule set forth in the majority opinion. The dis-
senters suggested that the delay associated with waiting for counsel
adversely affects both the accuracy of identification and investigative
efficiency." 9 The dissent noted further that the time spent awaiting the
113. 388 U.S. 218, 254 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and concurring).
114. Id at 253.
115. Id Even if defense counsel were not present at the confrontation, the witness(es),
police officer(s), suspect(s), and possibly others certainly were present. Defense counsel, the
court, the jury, and, if necessary, appellate courts could establish the circumstances sur-
rounding the identification through testimony elicited from those who were present.
116. 388 U.S. 218, 230 n.13 (1967).
117. Id at 236-37; see also People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 99, 634 P.2d 927, 934,
177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 583 (1981).
118. See People v. Martin, 2 Cal. 2d 822, 830, 471 P.2d 29, 34-35, 87 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714-
15 (1970). The minority in Wade argued that it is highly unlikely that a trial outcome would
change solely because examination of a witness by counsel present at the identification is
more effective that if counsel merely relied upon his training and experience. United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 254 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and concurring). The dissenters in
Wade also found the recommendation that defense counsel take the stand as a witness par-
ticularly disquieting in light of counsers role as an advocate. Id at 256. See also People v.
Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 859-60, 487 P.2d 942, 946-47, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6, 10-11 (1971) (Mosk,
J., dissenting), quoted in People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 99 n.7, 634 P.2d 927, 934 n.7,
177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582 n.7 (1981). In addition, the Justices in the Wade minority did not
share the majority's lack of confidence in the fairness and professional competence of police
officers. Wade, 388 U.S. at 252 (White, J,, dissenting and concurring).
119. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 255 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and
concurring).
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arrival of counsel may endanger the suspect's interest in prompt knowl-
edge whether he may leave or must remain. 20
In contrast to lineups, which were the subject of Wade, showups
present far greater impracticalities. The typical showup is in the field,
far away from the manpower and resources of the stationhouse. The
result of requiring counsel at showups would be to eliminate or se-
verely curtail the use of this identification procedure. 12 1 If the showup,
in its present form, is not necessary to effective law enforcement, it
should give way to other, more formal, procedures. However, many
courts have vouched for its usefulness, reliability, and necessity, at least
under certain conditions. 122
C. A Summary: Showups and the Wade Analysis
Having scrutinized field showups under the standard prescribed by
Wade,"3 several points have been established. The likelihood of mis-
identification at a lineup or showup depends on the susceptibility of the
witness to suggestion and on any actual suggestion at the identification
procedure. Whether requiring the presence of a defense attorney at
field showups would reduce the possibility of irreparable misidentifica-
tion depends on two factors: the deterrent effect of counsel's presence
on suggestive activity at the showup; and the potential improvement in
counsel's ability to present evidence to the court as a result of having
witnessed the confrontation.
Any challenged pretrial identification procedure must meet the
unnecessary suggestiveness test of Stovall " 4 This standard provides a
basis for evaluating the witness' susceptibility and the suggestiveness of
the procedure employed. Although the presence of counsel may dis-
courage impermissible suggestion in some cases, the cost of requiring
counsel at showups arguably is too great. Further, the impracticality of
requiring counsel in the field would render virtually unusuable the
highly reliable showup procedure, thereby severely hampering law en-
forcement efforts. Thus, application of the Stovalltest generally is held
to insure adequately against the dangers of irreparable misidentifica-
tion arising out of field showup situations.
Field showups should not be treated as an anomalous exception to
a hypothetical rule requiring counsel at all pretrial identification proce-
120. Id
121. People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 118, 127, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664-65 (1969).
122. See, e.g., People v. Craig, 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 913, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (1978);
People v. Rogriguez, 10 Cal. App. 3d 18, 28-30, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795-96 (1970); People v.
Anthony, 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 764-65, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767, 777 (1970); People v. Colgain, 276
Cal. App. 2d 118, 125-27, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664-65 (1969). See also Russell v. United States,
408 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
123. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
124. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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dures; nor should there be an arbitrary distinction between postindict-
ment lineups and all other forms of pretrial identification. It is
preferable to adopt a consistent, overall policy for pretrial identification
procedures. Part V of this Note presents a synthesis of the needs for
fairness and effective law enforcement as a basis for coherent, pretrial
identification policy.
V. The Continuum of Options
Law enforcement agencies, lawyers, courts, witnesses, and suspects
are all affected by our piecemeal approach to identification procedure.
The investigating officer needs standards regarding both how to con-
duct a showup and how to choose between the available identification
procedures. This final part evaluates several alternative theories of pre-
trial identification and discusses which methodology would best serve
the needs of fairness and effective law enforcement. These theories fall
along a spectrum from a right to counsel at all pretrial identifications,
unless exigent circumstances exist, to replacing the present right to
counsel with procedural safeguards at the law enforcement agency
level.
A. A Right to Counsel at all Pretrial Procedures
The rationale for requiring counsel at all pretrial identification
procedures is that the same dangers of irreparable misidentification
which are present in a suggestive lineup are also present in a suggestive
showup or photo identification. 2 5 The reasons given in Wade and Gil-
bert for imposing the right to counsel on lineups arguably applies to a
broader range of procedures.' 26 It should be noted that the same ma-
jority which remanded the post-indictment lineup cases of Wade and
Gilbert did not overturn the conviction of Stovall; however, the Court
treated Stovall differently not because the showup identification proce-
dure was dissimilar, but because there was no denial of due process in
his situation. 27 The Kirby opinion, limiting Wade and Gilbert to their
facts, 128 was widely criticized for ignoring their spirit.'29 Furthermore,
in People v. Bustamante,1 30 the California Supreme Court decided that
the distinction governing the right to counsel set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Kirby was arbitrary; in reaching its decision,
125. See Comment, supra note 104, at 163.
126. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
127. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967). Furthermore, Stovall's habeas corpus
petition did not entitle him to the prospective relief decreed in the other two cases. Id.
128. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 100-01, 634 P.2d 927, 935, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 576, 584 (1981). See generally Comment, supra note 99.
130. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981).
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the California Court used language susceptible to extension beyond the
facts of a pre-indictment lineup.
31
While there is a need to limit the suggestiveness of all identifica-
tion procedures, it has been demonstrated that imposing a right to
counsel on showups is an unsatisfactory solution.' 32 Counsel's mere
presence cannot remedy the underlying problems of eyewitness identi-
fication. Moreover, the spontaneous nature of a field showup renders
the requirement of counsel a significant burden on law enforcement.
Even if the United States Supreme Court or the California
Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to all identification situa-
tions, most showups would fall into the "exigent circumstances" excep-
tion. 33 It is illustrative, however, to determine whether other pretrial
identification methods could be amenable to such a rule.
Counsel cannot be provided for every face in the "mug book" a
victim studies when the perpetrator has eluded police. 134 Even when
the photo lineup consists of known associates of an identified member
of a group of perpetrators, counsel could not practically be provided
for each. These are fishing expeditions in which the police do not have
a specific suspect. Such an investigative photographic lineup clearly is
not a critical stage in the prosecution of a particular suspect.
135
There are photo identifications that are merely two dimensional
substitutes for formal, corporal lineups; however, a right to counsel has
never been required for these arrays by either the Supreme Court or the
California Supreme Court. 36 It has been suggested that the photo-
graphs used in a photographic lineup should be retained so that any
obvious suggestive distinctions could be evaluated by the court. 37 If,
however, the most pernicious form of suggestion comes from the ac-
tions of the presenting officer, rather than from the characteristics of
the photographs themselves, then such a photo array can be as sugges-
131. See id at 92, 634 P.2d at 929, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (1981) ("defendant's right to
counsel should not be limited to postindictment lineups").
132. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text."
133. See People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 118, 125-26, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664 (1969).
This point is discussed supra at notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
134. See Comment, supra note 104, at 167.
135. Id
136. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973); People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d
273, 279-80, 481 P.2d 212, 216-17, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208-09 (1971). Other jurisdictions,
however, do require the presence of counsel at certain photographic identification proce-
dures. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 186-87, 205 N.W.2d 461, 476 (1973);
People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338-39, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1974).
137. See, e.g., People v. Green, 3 Cal. App. 3d 240, 246, 83 Cal. Rptr. 491,494 (1969); see
also Comment, supra note 104, at 165. It is clear that the trial courts presented with such
packets of photographs find them instructive. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 34 Cal. App. 3d 834,
841 n.2, 110 Cal. Rptr. 440, 443 n.2 (1973).
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tive and as difficult to recreate at trial as a corporal lineup.
1 38
A requirement for counsel at all identification proceedings would
eliminate certain distinctions between procedures; however, such a rule
assumes that the presence of counsel is worth the social costs because
the potential for misidentification would be reduced. The fact that a
circumstance related exception is needed for showups, indicates that
the reasoning behind a rule requiring counsel cannot be extended to its
logical conclusion. The courts have upheld the constitutionality of the
showup because the procedure is reliable and efficient. The exigent cir-
cumstances exception indicates that the established methods of assur-
ing fairness at trial are sufficient to protect the defendant's rights if it is
impractical to obtain counsel.
B. The Present Hybrid
In both the federal courts and the state courts of California, identi-
fication procedures are categorized into a "postindictment lineup" col-
umn and an "everything else" column. 139 The California Supreme
Court and others have expressed dissatisfaction with the analysis re-
sulting in that distinction.'I
The plurality in Kirby determined that the right to counsel under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments did not attach until adversary
proceedings had commenced.' 4' The Court rejected analogies to Mi-
randa v. Arizona 4 ' and Escobedo v. Illinois,143 which guarantee the
privilege against self-incrimination, regardless of whether adversary
proceedings have commenced. 144 The Court noted that no Fifth
Amendment right was implicated in the Kirby lineup, so the Fifth
Amendment cases were not considered relevant precedent.145 The plu-
rality in Kirby ignored the argument of the majority in Wade that lack
138. Comment, supra note 104, at 166. See also People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 278,
481 P.2d 212, 216, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 (1971).
139. The federal standard of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), is also the California
standard after the passage of Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution. See supra
text accompanying notes 62-63.
140. See People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 97-98, 634 P.2d 927, 933, 177 Cal. Rptr.
576, 582 (1981). See also, generally, Comment, supra note 104; Levine & Tapp, The Psychol-
ogy of Criminalldentqfcation: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1079 (1973).
141. In much the same way that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires coun-
sel at custodial interrogations, but not at investigative detentions, Kirby requires counsel
when the prosecution has commenced, but not during "routine police investigation." Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
142. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
143. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
144. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 689 (1972).
145. Id at 687.
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of counsel at lineups diminished the effectiveness of counsel at trial.'46
The plurality opinion in Kirby reflects a compromise between the
Wade-Gilbert rule of the Warren Court and the retrenchment policy of
the Burger Court. The right to counsel at lineups does exist, but not
when the lineup is conducted prior to the formal commencement of
criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the plurality noted that "when a
person has not been formally charged with a criminal offense, Stovall
strikes the appropriate constitutional balance between the right of a
suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures and the interest of
society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved
crime.""47
Critics of the hybrid approach line both sides of the aisle. Those
who advocate extending the right to counsel feel that the primary basis
for the decision in Wade - that lack of counsel at a lineup diminishes
the potential effectiveness of counsel at trial - was ignored in Kirby.'
Proponents of a procedural solution to the problem of mistaken identi-
fication feel the Stovalltest strikes the appropriate balance for all pre-
trial identification situations, not just those arising before the filing of
formal charges."
C. The Procedural Approach
Both the United States Supreme Court in Wade and the California
Supreme Court in Buslamante considered the per se exclusionary rule
to be necessary in the lineup situation because there were no acceptable
standards of police conduct in place to prevent suggestion.5 0 In light
of this basis for the rule, it has been argued that a combination of rea-
sonable police procedures and the Slovalltest for suggestiveness would
eliminate the need for the presence of counsel at pretrial identifica-
tions.111 The goal of this approach is to avoid suggestion during the
146. This argument in Wade is discussed supra at notes 79-84. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Stewart, who had joined in the concurring and dissenting opinion to Wade, refused
to overrule Wade.
147. Id at 691.
148. See id at 693, 695, 696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal.
3d 88, 99, 634 P.2d 927, 934, 117 Cal. Rptr. 576, 583 (1981).
149. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 254 (1967) (White, J., dissenting and
concurring).
150. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d
88, 100, 634 P.2d 927, 934, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 583 (1981).
151. The California Supreme Court in People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 100, 634
P.2d 927, 934, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 583 (1981), refers to the following sources: United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967); People v. Fowler, I Cal. 3d 335, 348-49, 461 P.2d 643, 653-
54, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 373-74 (1969); SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION § 56 (1972); Pu-
laski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protec-
tion, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1097, 1101-02 (1974); Read, Lawyers at Lineups, Constitutional
Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance? 17 UCLA L. REv. 339, 379-93.
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identification while preserving a sufficient record of what occurred so
that the defense counsel can cross-examine effectively and the court can
determine whether the procedure was substantially unfair.
"Suggestion" has been defined as a signal to the witness that police
have reached a conclusion regarding the guilt of a particular suspect.' 52
A simple statement, prior to an identification procedure, to remind the
witness that the individual presented may or may not be the person
who committed the crime should alleviate much of the pressure on the
witness. Other guidelines should require the staging authorities to refer
to the witness' initial description prior to arranging a lineup or photo
identification so that the suspect does not stand out as the only person
matching key elements of the description.' 53 The witness' resistance to
whatever suggestiveness may be inherent in an identification procedure
can be established by having her participate in one or more identifica-
tions which do not include the suspect.1 54 Several courts have sug-
gested or required that once the police station has been reached, only
the formal, corporal lineup procedure should be used for a suspect in
custody.
155
Record keeping at police stations is becoming more sophisticated.
A lineup can be photographed. 156 The police department can save the
photographs used in an array and record each participant's height,
weight, and other relevant data. Building on the idea of a photo-
graphic array, lineups could be video taped for viewing by the witness
at a later time. Saving the video tape preserves the record of what the
witness saw. Police reports should and could be detailed in describing
the circumstances of showups and lineups.' 57 Finally, witnesses should
be made aware that it is as important that they remember the circum-
stances of the identification procedure as it is that they recall the cir-
cumstances of the crime.
The objective of the procedural approach is to standardize identifi-
cation procedures at a state-of-the-art level of objectivity. The more
scientific and methodical the procedure, the more objective and trust-
worthy the result.'58 Successful adoption of the procedural approach
would permit the presentation and evaluation of eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence to assume some of the more dependable qualities of testi-
152. See supra text accompanying note 98.
153. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 n.26 (1967).
154. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972).
155. See supra text accompanying note 30; see also cases cited supra note 136.
156. SeeUnited States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 n.26 (1967). The California Supreme
Court has upheld pure photographic lineups in which the witness is shown still photographs
of a lineup which was staged at an earlier time. People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273,481 P.2d
212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1971).
157. Id
158. See id at 239.
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mony based on the collection of physical evidence, such as
fingerprints. 159 The police officer would testify about her experience in
conducting identification procedures and the protective steps taken in
the showup or lineup in question. The identifying witness, the defend-
ant, or both, could also be called upon to describe the events.
There has been no call for a right to counsel at the fingerprint
dusting or analysis stages of a criminal investigation. So long as stan-
dard procedures are rigorously followed, the resulting evidence is gen-
erally accepted as reliable. Of course, there are inherent differences
between eyewitness identification evidence and physical evidence. Fin-
gerprint analysis involves the scientifid comparison of prints by profes-
sional analysts. Personal identification is necessarily more subjective;
however, there is no reason why the manner in which such identifica-
tion procedures are conducted - both in the field and in the sta-
tionhouse - cannot be a more professionalized area of police training
and experience.
1 60
Eyewitness identification will always present difficult evidentiary
problems. Nevertheless, to the extent that the police officers collecting
identification evidence can follow a set of standard procedures, the in-
formation will be available to permit defense counsel and the courts to
detect lack of reliability in this form of evidence.
Conclusion
This Note has reviewed pretrial identification theory with an em-
phasis on how the analysis, which developed for post-indictment line-
ups, must change in order to accomodate showups which occur at the
fact finding stage. The Supreme Court has expressed concern over the
need to prevent misidentification in all confrontation situations.
Rather than eliminate or render unworkable any particular method of
confrontation by imposing harsh procedural restrictions, the courts
should adopt a single, practical standard. In contrast to the right to
counsel analysis, which becomes unconvincing when applied to show-
ups, the alternative evidentiary focus, traditionally applied to showups,
is an appropriate test for all identification procedures including lineups.
The Stovall standard - together with certain procedural guidelines to
distinguish between appropriate methods of confrontation and direct
the staging of the method selected - strikes a desirable balance be-
tween fairness and effectiveness, thereby encouraging a full and com-
plete hearing at trial. The presence of counsel, which the Stovall
standard would require at most lineups, is but one of several elements
that may enhance the fairness of an identification procedure.
159. See supra text accompanying note 99.
160. See generally, Sapp, Issues and Trends in Police Professionalization, VIII CRIM.
JUST. MONOGRAPH, no. 5, 22-23 (1978).
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Showup identification procedures have a place in modem police
investigations. Despite the possiblity of suggestiveness, showups are
quick and reliable at a time when speed and accuracy are at a pre-
mium. Imposing a right to counsel on field identification procedures is
an undesirable means of improving the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony. Application of the time-tested general due process standard
with systematic guidelines for law enforcement personnel can achieve
the desired balance between fairness and effective law enforcement.
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